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In many ways, the international promotion of democracy is about power. But in the 
scholarship on this issue, there is remarkably little systematic attention to the role and 
relevance that power might have in regards to democracy promotion. This article critically 
discusses the literature that explicitly deals with power in democracy promotion and proposes 
a multidimensional perspective as a way to improve our understanding of the international 
politics of democracy promotion. First, the typology of power proposed by Barnett and Duvall 
is applied to systematically conceptualize the power dimension of democracy promotion. 
Second, the article revisits the two main attempts to theoretically grasp the role and relevance 
of power in democracy promotion, which draw on the Realist notion of relative power and a 
neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, respectively. With a view to both, it is argued that a 
multidimensional concept of power is analytically useful as it allows for grasping the complex 
nature of democracy promotion, which goes beyond inter-state relations and includes the 
attempt to change, from within, the very constitution of the recipient or target country. 
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International democracy promotion is, in many ways, concerned with power. By supporting 
local agents of democratic change, external democracy promoters shape domestic balances of 
power.
1
 In trying to get governments in target countries to embark on democratic reforms they 
would not otherwise pursue, democracy promoters also themselves exercise power.
2
 In order 
to project such political power, democracy promoters need the capacity to do so, that is: they 
require corresponding relative power vis-à-vis the targets.
3
 This multiple relation between 
power and international democracy promotion is rooted in the very subject matter. On the one 
hand, democracy as a system of political rule “is above all a matter of power,” and 
democratization is basically a process of redistributing political power.
4
 On the other hand, 
democracy promotion – as a unidirectional relationship between a promoter and a “recipient” 
or “target” – almost by definition mirrors asymmetric international power relations.
5
 
Given the unresolved debate about the concept of power in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR),
6
 it does not come as a surprise that there is no consensus view on the role and 
relevance of “power” in the international promotion of democracy. What is surprising, 
however, is the limited attention scholars have so far paid to this issue when studying 
democracy promotion. This corresponds to the “paradoxical” situation Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall observed some years ago with a view to global governance: that the 
increasing attention to this topic “has not included a sustained consideration of power.”
7
 The 
present article, in this sense, aims at initiating a systematic consideration of power in the 
4 
academic study of democracy promotion. It therefore critically reviews the existing 
scholarship on democracy promotion that explicitly deals with power and proposes a 
multidimensional perspective on power as a way to improve our understanding of the 
international politics of democracy promotion. 
The article proceeds in two steps. The first section draws on conceptual discussions about 
power in IR, and particularly on the typology of power developed by Barnett and Duvall,
8
 in 
order to systematically grasp the different ways in which democracy promotion is about 
exercising power. In line with Barnett and Duvall’s multidimensional perspective on power, I 
argue that power in democracy promotion does not only show up when democracy promoters 
somehow exert coercion in the sense of compulsory power. Rather, democracy promotion – 
because it aims at changing from within the very constitution of a given target state – is about 
exercising what Barnett and Duvall call structural and productive kinds of power. Yet, as will 
be seen, such constitutive (structural and productive) kinds of power cannot be simply 
“exercised”; both the (re-)sources and the effects of constitutive power lie beyond the relation 
of interaction between a democracy promoter and its target. The second section, then, revisits 
those two strands of democracy promotion research that have explicitly dealt with power, 
namely those that draw on neoclassical Realism and neo-Gramscian International Political 
Economy (IPE), respectively. In discussing these two approaches to democracy promotion, I 
will show that both would benefit from a multidimensional perspective on power and, in 
particular, from recognizing the crucial and complex role of constitutive power in democracy 
promotion. Because democracy promotion is essentially about changing target countries from 
within, power cannot be limited conceptually to the notion of an external actor exercising 
“power over” a given recipient. 
This paper, although sympathetic to the neo-Gramscian perspective, does not aim to put 
forward and defend a specific theoretic approach to democracy promotion. It rather suggests 
that the multidimensional concept of power is useful also for analyses of democracy 
5 
promotion that are informed by different – e.g., Realist or Liberal – theoretical perspectives. 
In general, I argue that the constitutive (structural, productive) dimensions of power very 
much explain why democracy promotion is so difficult, so limited in its ability to achieve the 
kind of effects it aims at, so contested and, in fact, so contradictory. 
In focusing on power in democracy promotion, this paper does not argue that democracy 
promotion should be viewed as power politics and nothing else. As Martha Finnemore and 
Judith Goldstein have argued, “power politics rarely explains all international outcomes,” but 
“ignoring relations of power risks missing the underlying dynamic of international affairs.”
9
 
This, I submit, does also hold for international democracy promotion. At the same time, the 
overall aim of this contribution is of a theoretical, conceptual nature. It is written as an issue-
specific contribution to the “agenda for theorizing power” in international relations.
10
 I, 
therefore, deliberately focus on questions specifically related to this issue: How can we 
conceptualize power in democracy promotion? To what extent can we conceive of democracy 
promotion as an exercise of power? To what extent is power a factor shaping democracy 
promotion? And what is it that determines (relative) power in democracy promotion? 
In what follows, I use a broad definition of democracy promotion that encompasses all 
measures that external actors take with the declared aim to contribute to establishing, 
strengthening, improving or defending democracy in another country. Such activities range 
from development aid projects and diplomatic appeals to democratic conditionality 
(incentives and sanctions) and the use of military force. Democracy assistance, in turn, refers 
to the subset of activities that are non-violent and concern the delivery of economic resources 
and technical know-how through foreign or development aid.
11
 Generally, democracy can be 
promoted by different kinds of external actors, be they states, international organizations, 
NGOs or even private companies,
12
 but the focus here will be on states. International 
organizations and non-state agencies are, thus, considered only as instruments of 
governmental democracy promotion, not as actors in their own right. Although democracy 
6 
promotion implemented by, or on behalf of, states still represents a large part of activities in 
the field, this certainly implies that the argument put forward in this article is limited. Here, I 
cannot discuss whether and how the conceptual framework proposed might also grasp the 
power of multilateral or nongovernmental democracy promoters. This state-centered 
perspective, however, does not apply to the recipient side. Target governments constitute a 
crucial counterpart for democracy promoters, and supporting and/or reforming state 
institutions is a core area of democracy assistance. Yet, cooperation with and support of non-
state actors – such as nongovernmental organizations, trade unions and business associations, 
private media, schools and universities – are also crucial avenues for democracy promotion 
which have to be considered when discussing the question of power in democracy promotion. 
The above definition of democracy promotion implies a normatively rather agnostic 
perspective: Democracy promotion is what a given external actors declares to be aimed at 
promoting democracy. This means, first, that the kind of democracy that is promoted in any 
individual case is dependent on the conception of democracy held by the particular democracy 
promoter.
13
 Second, to treat an activity as democracy promotion does not imply the 
assumption that it will necessarily have a corresponding effect: Whether democracy 
promotion actually promotes democracy – and if so, which kind of democracy – is an 
empirical question and not to be defined beforehand. 
 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE POWER DIMENSION OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 
 
In order to grasp the power dimension of international democracy promotion, this paper 
adopts the multidimensional concept of power in international relations developed by Barnett 
and Duvall.
14
 For three reasons, this approach is particularly suited for the issue at hand. First, 
7 
Barnett and Duvall substantially broaden the concept of power and therefore allow for 
grasping types of power that go beyond notions of material-based coercion. This is crucial 
because most activities of democracy promotion do not consist in the simple exercise of 
physical, compulsory force. Second, however, their concept of power is still “restricted to the 
production of particular kinds of effects, namely those on the capacities of actors to determine 
the conditions of their existence”:
15
 Power, as they define it, “is the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate.”
16
 
This focus – which deliberately rejects an all-encompassing notion of power synonymous 
with causality –
17
 is well-suited to the topic of democracy promotion, which is, by definition, 
about such kinds of effects.
18
 Third, their taxonomy of four types of power enables scholars to 
look at the “multiple forms of power [that] are simultaneously present in international 
politics,” including at the connections between these different forms.
19
 As will be seen, this 
multidimensionality of power is indeed important if we are to understand the complex role of 
power in democracy promotion. 
Barnett and Duvall’s four types of power are defined by differences in terms of two analytical 
dimensions. On the one hand, “power is either an attribute of particular actors and their 
interactions or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their 
social identities and capacities.”
20
 On the other, there are different degrees “to which the 
social relations through which power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and 
socially diffuse.”
21
 The resulting four types of power are: (1) compulsory power, which refers 
to “relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another”; (2) institutional 
power, which refers to “the control actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse 
relations of interaction”; (3) structural power, which concerns “the constitution of subjects’ 
capacities in direct structural relation to one another”; and (4) productive power, which 





The former two types of power refer to an actor-centered kind of “power over”: Compulsory 
power directly refers to Robert Dahl’s definition of power as a relation that enables control 
(“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do.”)
23
 and includes Realist approaches in IR; the notion of institutional power has 
been emphasized especially by the literature on international institutions and regimes. The 
latter two types of power, by contrast, refer to a constitutive kind of “power to”: Structural 
power, in particular, takes up the neo-Gramscian expansion of the concept of power as 
prominently developed by Steven Lukes, while the notion of productive power draws 
explicitly on Michel Foucault.
24
 Table 1 summarizes Barnett and Duvall’s four types of 
power. The ways in which they can be applied to democracy promotion, also summarized in 
the table, will be outlined in the following. 
 
 
Table 1: Barnett and Duvall’s four types of power and democracy promotion 
Type of power General characteristics Application to democracy promotion 
Compulsory power Actor-centered & direct Concerns the capacity of democracy promoters to directly 
shape behavior of (actors in) recipient countries 
Institutional power Actor-centered & diffuse Concerns the capacity to indirectly influence recipient 
behavior through a democracy promoter’s impact on 
international institutions and nongovernmental organizations 
Structural power Constitutive & direct Concerns the capacity to directly shape the structure of 
relations between democracy promoter and recipient as well 
as the structural conditions in recipient countries through 
interaction with (actors in) recipient countries 
Productive power Constitutive & diffuse Concerns the capacity to indirectly shape the structure of 
bilateral relations and the structural conditions in recipient 
countries through effects on general systems of knowledge 
and discursive practices 
9 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.” 
 
 
Power is a social phenomenon, a property or opportunity characterizing a social 
relationship.
25
 As democracy promotion – as defined in the introduction – concerns activities 
by an external actor that take place in or are related to another country, this relationship, at 
least, includes such an external actor and one or more recipient(s) in the target country. This 
holds true no matter if we are concerned with inter-governmental democracy promotion 
through diplomatic appeals, with official development cooperation between aid agencies and 
local “partners” or with purely non-governmental relations between international and local 
NGOs. Democracy promotion is, thus, exercised in “relations of interaction of actors,”
26
 
which points to the first two – actor-oriented – types of “power over.” 
 
 
Actor-Centered Power in Democracy Promotion: Compulsory, Institutional 
 
 
By definition, democracy promotion is about exercising compulsory power: it refers to 
“relations between actors that allow one to shape directly the circumstances or actions of 
another.”
27





 But promoting democracy by exerting pressure or 
imposing conditionality also includes the use of direct power: Even if democracy promoters 
avoid outright coercion and no matter their potentially “benign intent,” by imposing costs on 
and offering incentives to a given target government, they aim at causing the latter “to 
concede, to do something it would not otherwise choose to.”
30
 This is an exercise of power in 




Democracy promotion as an exercise of compulsory power, on the one hand, draws on 
material capabilities (military force; economic resources spent on democracy assistance; 
asymmetries in the distribution of material capabilities and vulnerabilities that allow for 
political conditionality and sanctions). On the other hand, it may also include the strategic 
usage of non-material resources. In the neo-Gramscian reading of democracy promotion, as 
coined particularly by William Robinson, democracy promoters do also exercise power if 
their activities are strictly limited to cooperative measures based on an explicit consent of the 
counterpart. In fact, the possibility to largely replace the use of “straight power” (i.e., coercive 
control) by “persuasion” as a means of consensus-based domination (“hegemony”) is 
precisely seen as the strategic advantage of democracy promotion.
32
 In this neo-Gramscian 
sense, Jeff Bridoux distinguishes between “coercive and consensual power” – a distinction 
that can be found, with different connotations, also in Joseph Nye’s concept of soft (as 
opposed to hard) power.
33
 In Nye’s conceptualization, “soft” (or “co-optive”) power concerns 
the capability of one country “to get other countries to want what it wants”, as opposed to “the 
hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.”
34
 Both “consensual” and 
“soft” power, therefore, explicitly include an element of ideological, or ideational, compulsion 
that is exercised by one actor over another.
35
 
But why should democracy assistance delivered in the form of development aid or moral 
appeals raised by diplomats be considered to involve power? Of course, democracy assistance 
does not involve (the use of) power as long as development cooperation is really equitable 
cooperation, based on “collective choice” and “joint action,”
36
 without any asymmetry. In the 
area of diplomacy, ideal-type persuasion that is “completely voluntary,”
37
 entirely based on 
the better argument and not shaped by any kind of asymmetric (economic, institutional, 
ideational) playing field is not power-related. Yet, these two theoretical constructs of “power-
free” democracy promotion are in fundamental tension with a basic asymmetry that is at the 
heart of the whole endeavor: Democracy promotion always presupposes the existence of some 
11 
external actor able and qualified to promote democracy and another one in need of receiving 
this kind of external support. In this “pedagogical” relationship constituted by the practice of 
democracy promotion,
38
 donors and recipients are, thus, fundamentally unequal, and it is the 





In addition, democracy promotion also operates through the activities of multilateral 
organizations and the effects of international regimes, which point to institutional power. 
When, for instance, the Organization of American States (OAS) promotes democracy in the 
Americas and democracy-related norms established at the level of the Western Hemisphere 
constitute collective expectations as to the appropriate structure and behavior of political 
regimes in the region, this is something different from the kind of direct power the US may 
exercise when it promotes democracy bilaterally. These are examples of institutional power 
because, here, the US as a democracy promoter exercises power “through institutions rather 
than directly.”
41
 Given the US government’s privileged influence on inter-American 
institutions, the US does still exercise power over other American countries (and does not just 
engage in horizontal cooperation) – but it does so by “working through the rules and 
procedures that define those institutions.”
42
 Also in the area of bilateral democracy promotion, 
governments in part deliberately chose indirect or mediated ways to pursue their policies. This 
is best exemplified by the public funding of NGOs that execute democracy aid projects. The 
criterion – that distinguishes compulsory from institutional power – is whether the democracy 
promoter maintains direct control over the intermediate institutions.
43
 Thus, when USAID 
contracts consulting firms to implement its democracy assistance programs, it still exercises 
compulsory power – just as the German government does through its official implementing 





Constitutive Power in Democracy Promotion: Structural, Productive 
 
 
Democracy promotion is by definition about (external) actors that do something. Yet, the 
logic of democracy promotion cannot be grasped by looking only at the interaction between a 
democracy promoter and a recipient or target. The specific thing about democracy promotion 
– as compared to other areas of foreign policy – is that it is intentional action that does not 
focus on “changing the policies of their counterparts in other countries but on altering the 
domestic authority structures within which these counterparts are embedded.”
44
 Democracy 
promoters, thus, aim at producing constitutive effects in the sense of the other two types of 
power. Even if a donor is capable of exercising (a certain amount of) control over a given 
recipient government or NGO through the interaction between the two, the real target (the 
shape of the political regime in question) lies beyond these direct “behavioral relations.”
45
 In 
their attempt to shape the political regime of another country, democracy promoters normally 
have neither direct nor indirect “control […] over the conditions of existence and/or the 
actions” of the recipient.
46
 This points to constitutive – structural and also productive – power. 
In less theoretic, but rather policy-oriented terms, this power dimension of democracy 
promotion has been highlighted by what Peter Burnell has dubbed the “Carnegie 
Perspective.”
47
 Analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and, in 
particular, Thomas Carothers have emphasized that democratization implies “struggles over 
power”
48
 and that democracy promotion, therefore, is about redistributing political power by 
strengthening “those groups inside countries who look most likely to make a difference.”
49
 
But supporting specific change agents is not enough: In order to make a difference, 
democracy promoters also have to deal with the “underlying relationships and structures of 
power at work in any particular sector they are trying to change.”
50
 The core issue at hand is 
what Nicolas Guilhot has called the “intrinsically revolutionary” nature of democracy 
13 
promotion: “To promote democracy is fundamentally to promote change. It aims at 
restructuring societies from the grass-roots level of civil society to the formal structures of 
power, transforming their economies as well in the process.”
51
 
Democracy promotion, thus, involves much more than the direct or institutionally mediated 
power external actors exercise over local recipients or targets. Democracy promoters, in 
acting in target countries with a view to shape their domestic politics and polities,
52
 exercise 
structural and productive power. They change – from within – the very constitution of a given 
counterpart: its properties, capacities and also its interests and collective identity. Constitutive 
effects in terms of democracy promotion thus depend on constitutive types of power – 
otherwise, democracy promoters do nothing but produce “uncertainty.”
53
 While democracy 
promoters directly interact with actors on the recipient side, democracy promotion is about 
(indirectly) contributing to the establishment, in other (recipient) countries, of democratic 
political institutions and democratic “change agents” (structural power) as well as of an 




Furthermore, just like the capital-labor and master-slave relationships mentioned by Barnett 
and Duvall, donor-recipient relations in the area of democracy promotion are also an example 
“of how social structures constitute unequal social privileges and capacities.”
55
 In the case of 
democracy promotion, however, the logic behind this asymmetric relationship is its 
overcoming: The “deficient” recipients are to become what the donors already are. Looking at 
the problematique from the perspective of structural power, then, shows that democracy 
promotion very much depends on the target country: At least a critical bloc of domestic actors 
has to buy into this subordinate role and the notion of a deficient state of their country, while 
accepting the role model status of the donor that shows to the recipient country “the image of 
its own future,” to use Karl Marx’ famous expression. This relationship – as internalized by 
the recipient – therefore constitutes a crucial element of the power base on which democracy 
14 
promotion rests. The donor-recipient relationship is shaped by the structural power of the 
democracy promoter, but it also depends on more general “systems of knowledge and 
discursive practices of broad and general social scope,”
56
 which are only indirectly influenced 
by the democracy promoter and point to the productive type of power. The latter, for instance, 
refers to the importance of the global development discourse which constitutes the categories 
of developed and developing countries and establishes concepts and standards of development 
(such as good governance or liberal democracy).
57
 
In sum, constitutive power (structural and productive) is crucial for democracy promotion in 
two related ways. On the one hand, a specific democracy assistance project or a diplomatic 
exercise in shaming and blaming may be regarded as being based on compulsory power (see 
above) – but their very aim requires democracy promoters to use these interaction-related 
power resources in order to exercise constitutive power. On the other hand, the very practice 
of democracy promotion is enabled and constrained by bilateral/direct and broader/diffuse 
relations that constitute structural and productive power.
58
 Democracy promoters, in the end, 
largely depend on recipients to acquire the corresponding “beliefs” and form the 
corresponding “desires.”
59
 In this sense, Levitsky and Way have argued that the (compulsory) 
use of “leverage” by Western states in order to promote democracy is most effective when 
combined with “extensive linkage to the West.”
60
 It is such economic, political and social 
linkage that “shapes the preferences of domestic actors,” creates “domestic stakeholders in 
democracy” and “redistributes domestic power in ways that favor democracy.”
61
 Democracy 
promotion, thus, involves the exercise of constitutive power at the level of the target country; 
but, at the same time, this exercise of power depends on democracy promoters and their 
targets being embedded in power relations that constitute the material and ideational 
conditions enabling democracy promotion. As I will argue in the following section, 
recognizing these constitutive dimensions of power offers important insights for existing 




ANALYZING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WITH A MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
CONCEPT OF POWER 
 
 
Two types of scholars working on democracy promotion have explicitly dealt with power: 
those informed by neoclassical Realism and those drawing on neo-Gramscian IPE. In this 
section, I will discuss these two approaches to democracy promotion in order to show that 
both would benefit from a multidimensional perspective on power. With a view to the Realist 
perspective, which is characterized by a narrow focus on relative power understood solely in 
terms of compulsion, the multidimensional power concept demonstrates that the different 
ways in which democracy promotion implies and requires an exercise of power concern not 
only the (more or less coercive) instruments used, but also the kinds of effects that are to be 
produced. Acknowledging the constitutive dimension of power, I will argue, allows for 
broadening the Realist explanation of variance in democracy promotion policies so that it can 
better grasp observable empirical patterns. 
Recognizing the need of democracy promoters to exercise power also in institutional, 
structural and productive terms has crucial consequences for the neo-Gramscian perspective 
on democracy promotion, too. As will be shown, prominent neo-Gramscian interpretations of 
democracy promotion, while including a deliberate attempt to go beyond a narrow, materialist 
notion of power and hegemony, very much stick to a compulsory (“top-down”) understanding 
of power. The multidimensional concept of power, I argue, enables differentiating the neo-
Gramscian attempt to theorize democracy promotion so that it can better capture the 




Explaining Variance in Democracy Promotion Policies: Revisiting the Realist Perspective  
 
 







 have emphasized that “relative power” is a significant factor that shapes 
(US) democracy promotion by constraining and enabling “the capability to use intervention as 
a mechanism of democratic change.”
65
 Power, here, is used as an explanatory factor. More 
specifically, Monten and Miller have argued that shifts in relative (US) power help explain 
why some US administrations have adopted democracy promotion as a major goal of their 
foreign policy and were even willing to use military force in its pursuit, while others have not 
(or much less so). None of the authors mentioned regards (relative) power as the one cause 
that explains everything (all of them, in fact, integrate identity-based and/or perceptual factors 
into their theoretical models). Still, relative power is regarded a necessary, if not sufficient, 
“precondition to actively promoting democracy abroad.”
66
 Because the relative power of a 
would-be democracy promoter determines its potential to exert influence on a given target 
state, relative power is regarded an important causal factor that helps explain variance in the 
democracy promotion policies of states.
67
 
In line with (neoclassical) Realism, power is defined as relative power of states measured by 
the relative distribution of material capabilities among states. Monten explicitly refers to the 
overarching Realist argument that “as their relative power rises states will seek more 
influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly.”
68
 
As power in neoclassical Realism is defined as the material capabilities “with which states 
can influence one another,”
69
 relative power is understood as “the relative amount of material 
power resources countries possess.”
70
 Such a materialist definition of power is explicitly 
defended against a relational definition of power as put forward, most prominently, by Dahl: 
17 
Neoclassical Realists see Dahl’s notion of power as a relation that enables control (see above) 
as practically unusable and also theoretically problematic (because power here is defined by 
its – potential – effects).
71
 Still, the theoretical argument advanced is clearly relational: As 
already mentioned above, Monten considers relative power as crucial in shaping democracy 
promotion because it defines a state’s capability to effectively support “democratic change” in 
other countries.
72
 This, of course, immediately provokes the question whether it is (relative 




A second issue raised by the Realist conceptualization of power concerns the question relative 
to what material (power) capabilities are to be measured. Again following neoclassical 
Realism, relative power for Monten and Miller means the power of one state (the US) “vis-à-
vis the rest of the international system.”
74
 While this may be reasonable when trying to 
account for overall changes in US grand strategy, democracy promotion policies are, by 
definition, oriented not at the systemic level but at a particular target state (where democracy 
is to be promoted). Such policies, according to the overall Realist logic, will then be shaped 
by the specific capability of power projection in a given bilateral relationship – and, 
therefore, by relative (US) power vis-à-vis the individual target country. This is, in fact, the 
way Henry Nau conceptualizes and measures relative (US) power: as the (dyadic) distribution 
of power capabilities between the US and an individual counterpart. At any point in time, 
therefore, US relative power in a given dyad can range from “decentralized and relatively 
equally distributed” to “unequally distributed and eventually centralized.”
75
 
Third, a major empirical problem with the grand theory explanations offered by Monten and 
Miller is that they tend to overlook the dramatic differences within one and the same US 
administration at any given point in time. For instance, the George W. Bush administration is 
categorized as having pursued an aggressive vindicationism (Monten) and as having turned to 
offensive liberalism (Miller). Even after 9/11, however, President Bush’s actual policies were 
18 
far from consistently aimed at spreading democracy across the world in an assertive manner. 
As Carothers has concluded, “[t]he main lines of Bush policy, with the singular exception of 
the Iraq invasion, have turned out to be largely realist in practice, with democracy and human 
rights generally relegated to minor corners.”
76
 In the Middle East, events such as the 
“electoral gains by Islamists in Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon” quickly caused the Bush 
administration “to abandon its pro-democracy push”; around the world, the so-called War on 
Terror and the administration’s international energy policy drove the US “into closer relations 
with helpful non-democratic governments.”
77
 While questions of power are certainly not the 
only relevant issues for this story, a multidimensional concept of power does help understand 
the dynamics at play. 
A research project comparing US (and German) democracy promotion in Belarus, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Pakistan, Turkey and Russia found that “relative power” as measured by the 
distribution of material capabilities between donor and recipient does play an important role 
in shaping democracy promotion policies.
78
 The causal effect of power, however, was not as 
clear-cut and homogenous as in the Realist conception. There was an unambiguous effect 
only in the case of small (or even negative) power asymmetries. In these circumstances, 
limited relative power directly led to a perception, on the part of the democracy promoter, that 
the potential influence on the recipient country was small. Under such premises, donors were 
reluctant to promote democracy and, as far as they did, avoided confrontational strategies. 
Conversely, however, high power asymmetries did not necessarily lead to high 
assertiveness.
79
 Taking the above discussion about the role of structural and productive power 
for democracy promotion into account, the reason for this finding is straightforward: Success 
of democracy promotion largely depends on the local conditions that enable constitutive 
effects within the given recipient country. These local conditions – as emphasized by the 
“Carnegie Perspective” – include, for instance, the existence of potent entry points and 
partners for the democracy promoter; a favorable domestic balance of power that includes 
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existing alternatives to the incumbent government; and an ideational acceptance by a critical 
bloc of domestic political forces of the donor-recipient relationship as well as of the shared 
goal (liberal democracy). Interaction-related (compulsory and institutional) power is a 
necessary condition for democracy promotion. Therefore, its absence effectively constrains 
what external actors can and will do in this policy area. Still, its presence is not sufficient for 
effectively enabling democracy promotion. 
This argument also explains why, as Carothers observed, the electoral victories by Islamist 
movements led the US administration to adopt a much more reluctant stance on promoting 
democracy in the Middle East. Events such as the 2006 victory of Hamas did not reduce the 
relative power of the US vis-à-vis Palestine. Yet, it showed the limited US capacity to shape 
domestic internal dynamics in Palestine and other Arab countries, the overall loss of attraction 
of ideas and values associated with “the West” as well as the risks for US strategic interests in 
the region associated with democratic procedures under such circumstances. The failure to 
bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq confirms that such a lack of constitutive power 
cannot be compensated by the use of military (compulsory) power.
80
 Very clearly, a specific 
distribution of material power capabilities does not directly imply the necessary structural and 
productive power required to exert the intended influence in a given recipient country. It is, 
therefore, not the dyadic distribution of power capabilities as such, but the perceived power of 
the donor in terms of influence that shapes democracy promotion. This requires a broader 
perspective on power, even when seeing the world from the perspective of neoclassical 
Realism. Given the fact that scholars such as Miller, Monten and Nau have already 
incorporated ideational factors into their theoretical models, there is no reason why they 




Theorizing Democracy Promotion: Revisiting the Neo-Gramscian Approach 
 
 
The concept of power used by Neo-Gramscian perspectives on democracy promotion goes 
beyond mere material-based compulsion. Most prominently, William Robinson has theorized 
democracy promotion as a deliberate strategy led by the US government that aims at securing 
“the hegemony of a transnational elite which is the agent of transnational capital.”
81
 
Recognizing this overall strategic purpose, according to Robinson, is necessary to understand 
what the US does – and does not – when it promotes democracy. For instance, democracy 
promotion is about promoting “polyarchy” or “low-intensity democracy” because it aims “not 
only at mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic 
status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing 
democratization of social life.”
82
 In contrast to the Carnegie perspective, democracy 
promotion here is seen as a strategy to basically guarantee existing structures of power both at 
the national and the international level.
83
 
Although neo-Gramscian analyses of democracy promotion are among the few works that are 
explicitly interested in “the power politics of today’s democracy promotion,”
84
 existing 
studies mostly do not engage with the concept of power as such.
85
 Neo-Gramscian analyses 
generally focus on a specific kind of power relation (hegemony) that, in Gramsci’s 
understanding, relies on “consensual domination.”
86
 Under conditions of hegemony, power 
structures – or relations of domination – are based on (ideological) consent protected by at 
least potential (material) coercion.
87
 In this sense, the neo-Gramscian understanding of power 
is broader than the narrow materialist conception in neoclassical Realism. As prominently 
argued by Steven Lukes, the most effective power structures are those in which open 
resistance is prevented in the first place because “[t]hose subject to it are led to acquire beliefs 




In line with a broader understanding of power, neo-Gramscian analyses of democracy 
promotion, therefore, emphasize the ideational dimension of exercising power (hegemony as 
consensus-based domination).
89
 Yet, they nevertheless tend to reduce democracy promotion to 
an instrument that is deliberately manipulable and deployable by those forces exercising global 
hegemony: They “ultimately rest on a conception of hegemony as a process of centrifugal or 
top-down diffusion of power, permeating civil society, culture, educational institutions and so 
forth, without ever encountering resistance.”
90
 Democracy promotion, according to Robinson, 
follows “the view that ‘democracy’ is the most effective means of assuring stability, the former 
seen as but a mechanism for the latter.”
91
 The implicit assumption seems to be that not only 
coercion-, but also consensus-based ways of exercising power in and through democracy 
promotion enable hegemonic forces to directly control the constitutive outcomes of their 
activities (“low-intensity democracy”). Yet, when seen from the perspective of a 
multidimensional concept of power, this is not a convincing application of the neo-Gramscian 
perspective.
92
 Taking the shape of hegemony, power, in the neo-Gramscian reading, is exercised 
at two levels: the international (between donor and recipient) and the domestic (intra-recipient). 
At both levels, the peculiar constitutive power of democracy promotion consists in its 
“ideological dimension,” namely “that democracy is a universal aspiration and the claim to 
promote it has mass appeal.”
93
 This ideational power base of democracy promotion imposes 
limits on the use of compulsory power. 
At the international level, democracy promoters need at least a certain amount of credibility in 
order to be able to exercise the kind of power associated with democracy promotion. In other 
words, the international institutions and norms that support democracy promoters’ compulsory 
power in terms of institutional power at the same time limit their capacity to unilaterally do (in 
the name of democracy promotion) whatever they please. Otherwise, they will undermine the 
very power base on which democracy promotion rests – as the experience with George W. 
Bush’s Freedom Agenda clearly shows.
94
 As Ned Lebow has argued, the Iraq War “offers 
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dramatic evidence that power [here understood in terms of material, compulsory power, JW] 
does not necessarily produce influence, and that its use in inappropriate ways – at odds with 
prevailing norms and practices – can seriously erode a state’s influence. For the United States, 
it has led to the seeming paradox that the most powerful state the world has ever witnessed is 
increasingly incapable of translating its power into influence.”
95
 
The same holds true for the intra-state level. In order for (US) democracy promotion to function 
the way Robinson claims, the people in the recipient countries have to believe, at least to certain 
extent, in polyarchy-as-democracy. Hegemony, in the neo-Gramscian framework, requires 
“active consent” and, therefore, involves “the internalization on the part of subordinate classes 
of the moral and cultural values, the codes of practical conduct, and the worldview of the 
dominant classes or groups.”
96
 Democracy, in this sense, has to be real to some extent.
97
 
Otherwise, it cannot fulfill its dual role to enable “intra-elite compromise and accommodation” 
and to politically incorporate “popular majorities,”
98
 and it will lose the ideological capacity to 
filter out “as illegitimate demands that actually call into question the social order itself.”
99
  
Robinson seems to assume that “the generation of consent – or hegemony – in civil society” can 
be thought of “as a unidirectional flow going from the top, i.e. the transnational elites, to the 
bottom, the popular masses.”
100
 Again, the experience with (US) democracy promotion in Iraq 
after the invasion shows very clearly that this is not that easy,
101
 as do cases of non-violent 
democracy promotion such as Bolivia.
102
 Theorizing democracy promotion from a neo-
Gramscian perspective, therefore, would benefit from a broader perspective on power which 
recognizes the need for democracy promotion – even in terms of Robinson’s promotion of 
polyarchy – to rely on constitutive power if it is to effectively support the emergence of 
polyarchic, consensus-based political regimes in other countries. 
This brief discussion suggests the need to incorporate the dimensions of institutional and, 
especially, constitutive (structural and productive) power into the neo-Gramscian theorization of 
democracy promotion.
103
 Prominent neo-Gramscian analyses of democracy promotion, while 
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embracing the ideational dimensions of power, tend to stick to an overly compulsory 
understanding of power. The theoretical move proposed here, in particular, reveals the intrinsic 
contradictions in democracy promotion as a simultaneous exercise of multiple kinds of 
power.
104
 Most notably, coercion- and consensus-based strategies to promote democracy are not 
simply complementary instruments that may be combined as need be in order to guarantee a 
given hegemonic world order. The result is paradoxical: Democracy promoters have the greatest 
power to effectively do the work they proclaim if they rely, in a consistent way, on (material and 
ideational) resources of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. At the 
ideational level, however, these power resources shrink once democracy promoters try to simply 
manipulate or instrumentalize democracy promotion to their advantage. The other way round, 
power is greatest when democracy promoters least compromise the capacity of the recipients to 
control their fate. Yet, the production of effects that constrain other actors’ “capacity to 
control their fate” is precisely part of Barnett and Duvall’s definition of power (see above). 
This implies that any successful exercise of power in and through democracy promotion – as 
it, by definition, impairs a recipient’s self-control – tends to reduce the very power base on 
which this exercise rests. This inherent inconsistency of democracy promotion is exemplified 
by the common call for local “ownership,”
105
 which is seen as necessary for effective 
democracy promotion but is, at the same time, basically denied by the very activities of 
democracy promoters.
106
 The limited effectiveness of democracy promotion is, thus, very 
much a consequence of its intrinsic contradictions. Acknowledging this is, by the way, also 
much more in line with “Gramsci’s own assertions on the complex and contradictory 









More than half a century ago, Robert Dahl predicted that scholars were not likely to produce 
“anything like a single, consistent, coherent ‘Theory of Power’,” but most probably only “a 
variety of theories of limited scope, each of which employs some definition of power that is 
useful in the context of the particular piece of research or theory but different in important 
respects from the definitions of other studies.”
108
 While certainly not exhaustive, the typology 
of power proposed by Barnett and Duvall has the advantage of conceptually grasping multiple 
forms of power that are of relevance for international politics in an integrative manner that 
refrains from treating them as competing concepts. As seen, this offers a promising way to 
conceptualize the role and relevance of power in international democracy promotion. 
By promoting democracy in other countries, states exercise power over others. This may 
include the use of material power resources, but it is obviously more than that. Furthermore, 
democracy promotion is not simply about an actor-centered kind of “power over,” be it material 
or ideational, compulsory or institutional. Promoting democracy also requires the capacity to 
exercise a constitutive “power to”: The aim, in the end, is to change from within the political 
regime of another state and, thus, its properties, capacities, interests and collective identity. At 
the same time, the whole endeavor of democracy promotion is dependent on inter- and 
transnational relations that constitute an asymmetric power relationship between democracy 
promoters and their “recipients.” A multidimensional concept of power helps us understand 
and conceptualize the ways in which the different types of power are relevant for democracy 
promotion and connected to each other. 
Specifically, a broad perspective on power draws our attention to the structural conditions – 
material and ideational, both within and beyond the recipient country – that enable and 
constrain the capacity of external actors to exercise constitutive kinds of power, be they 
structural or productive. This, on the one hand, helps to better grasp the role of (relative) 
power as a factor shaping democracy promotion policies – and thereby serves to overcome 
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some of the theoretical limitations inherent to a neoclassical Realist approach to democracy 
promotion. On the other, it explains why democracy promotion is so limited in its ability to 
achieve the kind of effects it aims at, and, in fact, so contradictory. It, thereby, also helps to 
improve the attempt to theorize democracy promotion from a neo-Gramscian perspective. 
Yet, the core claim of this article – that the multidimensional concept of power is useful for 
understanding the international politics of democracy promotion – is independent from these 
two specific theoretical approaches. Just as Barnett and Duvall have argued, each theoretical 
tradition may favor “one or another” type of power, but this should not prevent scholars from 
drawing on those types of power “that are associated with other theoretical schools.”
109
 No 
matter the theoretical predisposition of the individual scholar, this article has suggested that it 
is futile to think about power in democracy promotion without paying attention to the local, 
trans- and international power relations that constitute the very practice of democracy 
promotion and, thereby, enable and constrain external actors in exercising the constitutive 
power they require in order to effectively promote whatever they regard as democracy. In the 
field of democracy promotion, actor-centered, top-down kinds of power are systematically 
dependent on constitutive conditions and local dynamics which can, themselves, not be 






This article draws on results from a research project conducted between 2008 and 2012 at the 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Goethe University Frankfurt which received 
generous funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG). The overall results of the 
project are published in Jonas Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., 
26 
The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2014). 




                                                 
1
 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 105-108; Nicolas Guilhot, The 
Democracy Makers. Human Rights and International Order (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), p. 31; Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU democracy 
promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?,” Democratization 18, no. 4 
(2011): 890-891. 
2
 Jeff Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction. Comparing Japan and 
Iraq (London: Routledge, 2011), chapter 1; Peter Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad. 
Policy and Performance (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011), pp. 77-78; 
William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy. Globalization, United States Intervention and 
Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 1. 
3
 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine. Power, Nationalism, and Democracy 
Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 112-156; Henry R. Nau, 
“America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interests: Beyond Realism, Beyond 
Idealism,” in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., American 
Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 127-148. 
4
 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist 
Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 5. 
 
27 
                                                                                                                                                        
5
 Philippe C. Schmitter, “International democracy promotion and protection: Theory and 
impact,” in Nuno Severiano Teixeira, ed., The International Politics of Democratization: 
Comparative perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 32; Teivo Teivainen, “The 
Pedagogy of Global Development: The promotion of electoral democracy and the Latin 
Americanisation of Europa,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009): 163-164. 
6
 See David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE, 
2002), pp. 177-191; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 
in International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 39-75; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 
eds., Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Felix 
Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds., Power in World Politics (London: Routledge, 
2007); Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., Back to Basics: State Power in a 
Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
7
 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in global governance,” in Barnett and 
Duvall, Power in Global Governance, p. 2. 
8
 See Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics”; Barnett and Duvall, Power in 
Global Governance. 
9
 Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, “Puzzles about Power,” in Martha Finnemore and 
Judith Goldstein, eds., Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 5. 
10
 Finnemore and Goldstein, “Puzzles about Power,” p. 5. See also Barnett and Duvall, 
“Power in International Politics”; Barnett and Duvall, Power in Global Governance; 
Berenskoetter and Williams, Power in World Politics. 
11
 Dinorah Azpuru, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Trends 
in Democracy Assistance: What Has The United States Been Doing?,” Journal of Democracy 
 
28 
                                                                                                                                                        
19, no. 2 (2008): 151. See also Peter Burnell, “Democracy Assistance: The State of the 
Discourse,” in Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for 
Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 3-33. 
12
 See Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002); Richard Youngs, International Democracy and the West. The Role of 
Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Re-Visioning Democracy Promotion (London: 
Routledge, 2013), chapters 7-10. 
13
 On this overall issue, see Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki, eds., The Conceptual 
Politics of Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2012); Kurki, Democratic Futures. 
14
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics”; Barnett and Duvall, Power in Global 
Governance. The edited volume by Finnemore and Goldstein (Back to Basics) also draws on 
this typology. For a different, not as systematic discussion of power in international relations, 
see Berenskoetter and Williams, Power in World Politics. 
15
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 42. 
16
 Ibid., p. 45. 
17
 Ibid., p. 42. 
18
 As defined above, democracy promotion concerns activities by external actors that aim at 
producing effects on/in other countries. 
19
 Ibid., p. 44. In the same vein, Finnemore and Goldstein have argued that “attention to 
multiple dimensions of state power is helpful, even essential, to understanding many of the 
puzzling manifestations of it we see in contemporary politics.” Finnemore and Goldstein, 
“Puzzles about Power,” p. 4. 
20
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 42. 
21
 Ibid., p. 43. 
 
29 
                                                                                                                                                        
22
 Ibid., p. 43. Defining structural power through the use of the qualifier “in direct structural 
relation” risks making the definition circular. What is meant here is, in other words, “the 
production and reproduction of internally related positions of super- and subordination, or 
domination, that actors occupy.” Ibid., p. 55. 
23
 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-203, 
emphasis in original. 
24
 See the discussion of the various concepts of and perspectives on power in IR in Stefano 
Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” International 
Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 443-478; Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”; 
Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” pp. 49-57; Berenskoetter, “Thinking 
about power,” pp. 4-12. 
25
 Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power,” p. 3. See also Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” p. 
203; Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 45; Finnemore and Goldstein, 
“Puzzles about Power,” pp. 3-4. 
26
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 45. 
27
 Ibid., p. 49. 
28
 Laurence Whitehead, “The Imposition of Democracy,” in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., 
Exporting Democracy. The United States and Latin America. Case Studies (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 234-260. 
29
 Steven D. Krasner, “New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions of Power,” in 
Finnemore and Goldstein, Back to Basics, p. 349. 
30
 Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, p. 78. See also Steven Levitsky and Lucas A. Way, 
“International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 21-22. 
31
 See also Krasner, “New Terrains,” pp. 349-50. 
32
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, chapter 1. 
 
30 
                                                                                                                                                        
33
 Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction, p. 27. Gramsci’s original 
distinction was between “domination” (dominio) and “intellectual and moral leadership” 
(direzione); the former implies ruling “by coercion and direct domination,” the latter through 
the organization of “consent and hegemony.” Translations are taken from David Forgacs, 
eds., The Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings 1916-1935 (New York, NY: New York 
University Press, 2000), pp. 249, 420.  
34
 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 166, emphasis in original. 
35
 Yet, what is crucial about Gramsci’s take on hegemony – and, thus, consensual power – is 
that, while involving such an element of unidirectional control, it is based not simply on one-
sided manipulation but includes active consent, which “presupposes that account be taken of 
the interests of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised.” Forgacs, The Gramsci 
Reader, p. 211; see below, section “Theorizing Democracy Promotion.” 
36
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 42. 
37
 Ibid., p. 42. 
38
 Teivainen, “The Pedagogy of Global Development.” 
39
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 45. 
40
 Hence, Schmitter has argued that, no matter how “voluntary and reciprocal in principle,” 
the practice of democracy promotion “is almost always semi- to in-voluntary and 
asymmetric” – not least because it is based on “the presumed superiority of well-established 
liberal democracies.” Schmitter, “International democracy promotion and protection,” p. 32. 
41
 Krasner, “New Terrains,” p. 351. 
42
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 51. 
43
 Ibid., p. 51. 
44
 Krasner, “New Terrains,” p. 341. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. 
Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 631. 
 
31 
                                                                                                                                                        
45
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 45. 
46
 Ibid., p. 48. 
47
 Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, pp. 75-9. 
48
 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” Democratization 4, 
no. 3 (1997): 123. 
49
 Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad, p. 76. 
50
 Thomas Carothers, “Taking Stock of Democracy Assistance,” in Cox et al., American 
Democracy Promotion, p. 194; see also Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, pp. 105-108. 
51
 Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, p. 31. In actual practice, of course, democracy promotion 
has rarely fully embraced this revolutionary task. With a view to US democracy promotion, 
Tony Smith has, for instance, detected “a paradoxical form of ‘conservative radicalism’.” 
Tony Smith, America’s Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for 
Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 17. 
52
 See Julia Leininger, “‘Bringing the outside in’: illustrations from Haiti and Mali for the re-
conceptualization of democracy promotion,” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 63-80. 
53
 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” p. 631. From their actor-
centered rational choice perspective, the promotion of democracy by means of military 
intervention – i.e., by exercising compulsory power – is, therefore, normally not a rational 
strategy (and, thus, most of the time not really pursued by intervening states). 
54
 As Barnett and Duvall (“Power in International Politics,” p. 55) emphasize, the two types of 
constitutive power “overlap in several important respects” but are different in that structural 
power “works through direct structural relations” and concerns “the production and 
reproduction of internally related positions of super- and subordination,” whereas productive 
power “entails more generalized and diffuse social processes” and concerns “the constitution 
of all social subjects with various social powers through [broad and general] systems of 
 
32 
                                                                                                                                                        
knowledge and discursive practices.” In the following, I shall refer to constitutive power in a 
general sense when this distinction is not important to the argument. 
55
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 53. 
56
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 55. 
57
 See, for instance, Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and 
Good Governance (London: Zed Books, 2000); Guilhot, The Democracy Makers; Kurki, 
Democratic Futures; Teivainen, “The Pedagogy of Global Development.” 
58
 It is this second way in which constitutive power is relevant for democracy promotion that 
directly corresponds to Barnett and Duvall’s thinking about constitutive (structural and 
productive) power in international relations and global governance. The first notion of 
constitutive power – as exercised by an external actor within a given target country – is 
different in that it responds to the specific character of democracy promotion as something 
taking place at the level of domestic politics. 
59
 This refers to what Lukes has called an “imposition of internal constraints”: “Those subject 
to it are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to 
being dominated, in coercive and non-coercive settings.” Steven Lukes, Power. A Radical 
View. Second Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 13. 
60
 Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” p. 22. 
61
 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
62
 Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interests”; Henry R. Nau, At 
Home Abroad. Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
63
 Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine.” 
64
 Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive 
Liberalism, and the War in Iraq,” Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010): 26-65. 
 
33 
                                                                                                                                                        
65
 Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” p. 115. 
66
 Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” p. 118. Monten is interested in explaining the 
“long-term shift [in US foreign policy] from exemplarism to vindicationism” that culminated 
in the Bush doctrine, which he does by looking at changes in relative power and national 
identity (ibid., p. 115). Miller, by contrast, focuses on the “major change in the Bush 
Administration’s security policy before and after 9/11” (Miller, “Explaining Changes in U.S. 
Grand Strategy”, p. 28). This shift, he argues, cannot be explained by Monten. In his 
explanation, Miller basically amends the focus on relative power by adding a second 
“material-systemic” factor, namely “the degree of external threat”; further two “domestic-
ideational” factors are only considered intervening variables (ibid., p. 29). 
67
 For a non-Realist approach to relative power, see for example the notion of “relative 
bargaining power” which is considered to shape the bargaining process characterizing EU 
democracy promotion by conditionality. Here, relative power is regarded the “result of the 
asymmetrical distribution of the benefits of a specific agreement.” Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, “EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood,” pp. 892-893. 
68
 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in World Politics 51, 
no. 1 (1998), p. 152. See Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” p. 117. 
69
 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 4. 
70
 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 152. 
71
 See Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, p. 4; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of 
Foreign Policy,” p. 151, fn. 15. 
72
 Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” p. 115. 
73
 This “disconnect between capabilities and outcomes” is well-known from the literature on 
power in international relations (Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 40; 
 
34 
                                                                                                                                                        
see Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” pp. 179-181; Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. Third Edition (New York, NY: Longman, 2001), 
p. 10). Given the aim to produce profound domestic effects in another country, this disconnect 
is significantly greater in democracy promotion than in traditional inter-governmental 
relations. 
74
 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 150. See Miller, 
“Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy,” p. 29; Monten, “The Roots of the Bush 
Doctrine,” p. 141. 
75
 Nau, At Home Abroad, p. 27. See also Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion 
and National Interests.” 
76
 Thomas Carothers, “The Democracy Crusade Myth,” The National Interest 90 (2007): 8. 
77
 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
78
 See Wolff et al., The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion. 
79
 US policies towards Bolivia are a case in point: Although vital US security interests (related 
to the so-called War on Drugs) and regional strategic interests (related, in particular, to the 
alliance led by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela) were directly challenged by the elected 
government of Evo Morales (since 2006), the US government reacted rather ambivalently 
and, in any case, refrained from openly confronting the Bolivian government while trying 
seriously to somehow remain engaged with the country. See Jonas Wolff, “Democracy 
promotion, empowerment, and self-determination: conflicting objectives in US and German 
policies towards Bolivia,” Democratization 19, no. 3 (2012): 415-437. 
80
 See Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 557; Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World 
Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 2-3. 
81
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 4. 
 
35 
                                                                                                                                                        
82
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 6. 
83
 The “underlying objective” of (US) democracy promotion is to maintain “essentially 
undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system.” Robinson, Promoting 
Polyarchy, p. 6. For related approaches to democracy promotion, see also Rita Abrahamsen, 
“The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on 
Democratisation,” Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 1 (1997): 129-152; Colin S. 
Cavell, Exporting “Made-in-America” Democracy. The National Endowment for Democracy 
& U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002); Neil A. Burron, 
The New Democracy Wars. The Politics of North American Democracy Promotion in the 
Americas (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
84
 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. xiv. 
85
 But see Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction, chapter 1. 
86
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 21. 
87
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 22. See also Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and 
Postwar Reconstruction, pp. 28-36, and Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, pp. 189-221, 235. 
88
 Lukes, Power, p. 13. A similar argument is made by Guilhot with reference to Bourdieu’s 
concept of “symbolic power,” i.e. “the power to make domination seem legitimate” (Guilhot, 
The Democracy Makers, p. 168). An even broader – and, in fact, all-encompassing – concept 
of power is used by those scholars that draw on Foucault and, in particular, his concept of 
governmentality. On the latter, see Felix Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power,” in 
Berenskoetter and Williams, Power in World Politics, pp. 10-12. With a specific view to 
democracy promotion, see the integrated Gramscian/Foucauldian perspective proposed by 
Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures, chapters 11-12. 
 
36 
                                                                                                                                                        
89
 See Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Barry K. Gills, “American Power, Neo-liberal 
Economic Globalization, and Low-Intensity Democracy: An Unstable Trinity,” in Cox et al., 
American Democracy Promotion, pp. 326-344. 
90
 Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, p. 15. 
91
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 66. 
92
 See Jeff Bridoux, “‘It’s the political, stupid’: national versus transnational perspectives on 
democratisation in Iraq,” The International Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 4 (2011): 552-
571; Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A 
proposal for theoretical classification,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 1 (2011): 86. 
93
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 16. See also Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, p. 15. 
94
 See Thomas Carothers, “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush” (2007), 
available at: 
{http://carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf} accessed 
14 February 2013; Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad. Why We Should and 
How We Can (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), chapter 1; Reus-Smit, American 
Power and World Order; Laurence Whitehead, “Losing ‘the Force’? The ‘Dark Side’ of 
democratization after Iraq,” Democratization 16, no. 2 (2009): 215-242. 
95
 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, p. 557. In much the same way, 
Christian Reus-Smit has stressed “the importance of authority, legitimacy and institutions for 
sustainable political influence,” exposing a “central paradox of hegemony: that stable, 
enduring leadership requires power to be socially embedded, and that unilateral action can be 
socially corrosive, with implications for both the preponderant state and world order.” Reus-
Smit, American Power and World Order, p. 6. 
96
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 21, emphasis in original. In general terms, the same 
applies to Bourdieu’s symbolic power or a Foucauldian notion of governmentality (see note 88). 
 
37 
                                                                                                                                                        
97
 See Guilhot, The Democracy Makers, p. 18; Bridoux, “‘It’s the political, stupid’”, p. 556; 
Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion,” p. 86. 
98
 William I. Robinson, “Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America,” in Cox 
et al., American Democracy Promotion, p. 312. 
99
 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 30. 
100
 Bridoux, “‘It’s the political, stupid’”, p. 561. See William I. Robinson, “What to Expect 
from US ‘Democracy Promotion’ in Iraq,” New Political Science 26, no. 3 (2004): 441-447. 
This tendency of neo-Gramscian scholars to see hegemony, contra Gramsci, “as a one-
directional power relationship […] forced or imposed on subaltern classes” is a general 
feature also outside the study of democracy promotion. Randall D. Germain and Michael 
Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International relations theory and the new Gramscians,” Review 
of International Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 18. 
101
 See Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction; Bridoux, “‘It’s the 
political, stupid’”. 
102
 See Wolff, “Democracy promotion, empowerment, and self-determination.” 
103
 With a view to productive power, see the proposal for integrating Gramscian and 
Foucauldian concepts in an analysis of democracy promotion by Kurki, Democratic Futures, 
chapters 7-10. 
104
 There are, of course, also other issues with Robinson’s interpretation of democracy 
promotion that would merit discussion and, from my point of view, revision. See Bridoux, 
“‘It’s the political, stupid’”; Kurki, Democratic Futures, chapter 11; and the forum on 
“Democracy and world order” in International Relations 27, no. 2 (2013): pp. 226-257. 
105
 See, for instance, Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy. The Struggle to Build Free 
Societies Throughout the World (New York: Times Books, 2008), pp. 316-317. 
 
38 
                                                                                                                                                        
106
 For a more general discussion of the inherent contradictions of democracy promotion, see 
Annika E. Poppe and Jonas Wolff, “The Normative Challenge of Interaction: Justice Conflicts 
in Democracy Promotion,” Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 3 (2013): 373-406. 
107
 Owen Worth, “Recasting Gramsci in international politics,” Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 384. See also Germain and Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci,” pp. 18-19. 
108
 Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” p. 202. 
109
 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 45. 
